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Using regional data of Kenya, we found that income spillovers depend on ethnic similarity, which 
suggests the influence of ethnic bias. This result implies, for policy making, that the question of 
interregional transaction costs cannot be narrowly focused on problems of transportation 
infrastructure but it is also related with ethnic divisions in African context. 
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Africa’s economic development has been affected by unfavorable economic geography 
(Venables, 2010). On the continent where most people depend upon agriculture, endowments of 
high-quality agricultural land with adequate rainfall are scarce. There is a high propensity to disease, 
both in humans and animals. Location is also an important matter. Aside from being a long distance 
from the world’s main economic hubs, many countries are land-locked. Sub-Saharan Africa as a 
whole has virtually no navigable river and few natural harbors. 
Collier and Venables (2010) and Venables (2010) point out that Africa’s economic growth 
prospects are also affected by its fragmentation into more than 50 small nations. Because economies 
of scale are forgone, the costs of public good provision are high and supplies of private goods are 
often monopolized. Moreover, these impediments to private and public economies are mutually 
reinforcing. Based on an empirical assessment of the degree of international market integration of 
Sub-Saharan African countries, Bosker and Garretsen (2008) predicts that improving intraregional 
market access will have a considerable positive effect on economic growth. 
Market integration within each country remains low, which presents three important 
implications for efficiency and growth of economies. First, as with the context of international 
economics, gains from trade based on the comparative advantages of each region will be lost. 
Second, factor endowments are distributed unevenly among regions. Lack of factor mobility will 
give rise to growth constraints in those nations with no resources, simultaneously diminishing 
returns to resource earnings in those who have plenty (Venables, 2000). Third, and related to the 
above points, an economy with high interregional trade costs and low factor mobility is prone to 
geographical dispersion of population and production (Fujita et al., 1999). Consequently, cities and 
individual production units are smaller than optimal size. Insufficient agglomeration is related with 
the low level of the division of labor, knowledge spillover, and higher costs of shared inputs 
(intermediate goods and services and local infrastructure), leading to low productivity. 
Given that geographical factors strongly influence economic development in Africa, strong 
emphases have been given to the need for improving physical transportation infrastructure. 
Admitting that importance, we should also consider the presence of ethnic bias that constitutes 
divisions in the market economy, as often pointed out by researchers of the African economy. For 
example, Bates (2000) observes that because public institutions are weak in Africa, people seek a 
better life through private relations, such as capitalization through remittances from migrants to the 
cities and formation of skills through face-to-face contacts. If families organize the relations across 
generations and locations, then ethnicity provides rules and enforcement in such informal contracts 
about what should be done and what should not. Fafchamps (2004) explains that ethnic bias persists 
in a self-sustaining way because of statistical discrimination and network effect. The former dictates 2 
 
that individuals belonging to different groups might be treated differently even if they share identical 
observable characteristics in every other respect because of high cost of gathering and evaluating 
information
1. The latter refers to the characteristic of market transactions in Africa, which involve 
many intermediaries in sequential steps that are linked by the chain of trust-based personal 
acquaintances to minimize the potential for breach. Ethnic diversity per se is not a source of 
inefficiency because heterogeneity (in technology, taste, etc.) forms the basis for trade, as predicted 
by international trade theory. When ethnic diversity and ethnic bias are combined, inefficiency arises 
because the market is fragmented into small homogeneous markets. 
It is also noteworthy that, specifically in the context of Kenya, ethnic groups have a “blocker” 
geographic distribution by which ethnic identities correspond reasonably well with geographic 
placement (Shipton, 2009). Oucho (2002) points out: “the present day provinces are largely a repeat 
of those created in 1924, apparently a deliberate attempt by the departing colonial administration to 
institutionalize tribalism or ethnocentrism in independent Kenya.” (p.42) and “Kenya’s districts had 
been so sub-divided that their structure portends intensified ethnocentrism and bright prospects for 
regionalism.” (p.43) The separation along ethnic lines for historical reasons has been sustained 
through low labor mobility because of weak agglomeration economies, as described above
2. As a 
result, ethnic heterogeneity at a national level co-exists with high degree of homogeneity at the 
local-level (Ranis, 2009). Therefore, we might observe high transaction costs in inter-regional 
domestic trade both in terms of physical infrastructure and ethnic divisions. 
Following that discussion, this paper presents a case study of Kenya from a viewpoint that 
ethnic diversity, interacting with ethnic bias and geographical fragmentation, affects economic 
performance through low market integration. These analyses specifically examine two issues. The 
first is whether the economic situation of a local unit is affected by that of surrounding ones. The 
basic assumption here is that the lower the interjurisdictional barriers are, the more frequently people 
and businesses interact, thereby achieving higher welfare. The second is to investigate whether the 
interregional divisions are affected by ethnic heterogeneity. 
The second section presents the basic structure of our empirical analysis. We will extend it to a 
spatial correlation model in the third section and to what we call ethnically augmented spatial 
correlation model in the fourth section. The final section concludes and presents discussion of future 
directions of study. 
 
2. Basic model 
                                                        
1  Mohamed and Zenou (2005) presented a theoretical model suggesting that discrimination in the labor market might 
occur along ethnic lines in developing countries where people are ethnically diverse and production is highly volatile. 
Employers tend to hire workers of similar ethnic background; employees from different ethnic groups bear the risk of 
production volatility whereas those from similar ethnic background of the employee earn a stable income. 
2  Miguel and Gugerty (2005) suggest that relocation cost is high in rural Kenya because of thin local land markets 
and difficulty in obtaining approval from relatives to sell the clan land. 3 
 
 
We first set up a model without ethno-geographical elements. The estimated regression equation is 
shown below. 
 
                                     (1) 
 
We investigate the poverty headcount ratio and log of per capita income as dependent variables. 
Included in the dependent variable set X are: access to main trunk roads (as a measure of 
infrastructure); population share having no formal basic education, or the adult illiteracy ratio 
(human capital); and ethnic fractionalization, or ethnic polarization (ethnic diversity). As common 
sense might reveal, we expect that access to roads can reduce poverty (therefore, a positive sign is 
assumed for the estimated coefficient) and that it has a positive impact on income; the human capital 
variable is expected to have a negative coefficient on poverty and positive on income. We set no 
preconceived notion related to the impact of ethnic diversity on poverty and income
3. We also 
introduce regional dummy D referring to Nyanza, Rift Valley, and Nairobi & Central to capture the 
level differences. More detailed descriptions of variables are given in the appendix. The error term is 




Estimated results obtained using equation (1) are presented in Table 2. We set the poverty 
headcount ratio as a dependent variable in the first two columns. As expected, access to trunk roads 
will decrease poverty; a lack of formal basic education is associated with higher incidence of poverty. 
Higher ethnic diversity shown by the fractionalization index has negative effect. After controlling for 
physical and human capital, higher fractionalization is related with a lower incidence of poverty at 
the district level, which suggests the role of migration from districts with a higher intensity of 
poverty to lower ones where ethnic diversity tends to be higher because of demographic inflow. The 
polarization index has no statistically significant effect. Regional dummies show that poverty is 




In the right-most two columns of Table 2, we chose per-capita GDP as the dependent variable. 
                                                        
3  Previous studies suggest that ethnic diversity is related with higher incidence of poverty and lower income level 
(Easterly and Levin, 1997). Alesina and Ferrara (2004) consider the optimal level of ethnic diversity as the balance of 
benefit from diversity and cost of heterogeneity. They found that the former increases with the level of per capital 
output implying that, although ethnic diversity might not be beneficial in poor economies, it might be so in rich ones. 4 
 
In this case, the effect of access to trunk roads is not statistically significant, although that of lacking 
basic formal education is negative, as expected. Ethnic fractionalization correlates positively with 
income, probably in the same context as the poverty case. Ethnic polarization has no explanatory 
power in this case, either. The regional dummy is only significant for Central & Nairobi. 
 
3. Spillover from adjacent districts 
 
Next, we include situations in adjacent districts as determinants of poverty and income. The 
regression we estimate is of the following form. 
 
                                                 (2) 
 
In that equation, Wi is the adjacency weight consisting of w   n  ⁄  where we assign w    1  if 
districts i and j share the border and 0 otherwise; ni denotes the number of districts that share a 
border with district i.
4 Equation (2) is called the spatial correlation model or spatial lag model. 




Estimated results of variables road, no_edu adult, illiteracy, fractionalization, and polarization 
barely change from those shown by equation (1). Focusing on estimates of parameter    of  equation 
(2), we found a positive spatial correlation for the district-level poverty headcount ratio (i.e. poverty 
spillover), although the spatial correlation of per capita district GDP was not statistically significant: 
after controlling for conditions of physical and human capital and the degree of ethnic diversity, a 
district exhibits higher intensity of poverty if it is adjacent to poor neighbor districts, but such 
systematic relation is not observed for the income level. 
 
4. Impacts of ethnicity 
 
Now we introduce ethnicity by modifying the spatial correlation model of equation (2) to the 
following form:   
 
                                       .            (3) 
 
                                                        
4  We do not include regional dummies that appear in equation (1) because correlation can be expected with the 
spatial lag term	     . 5 
 
where     stands for ethnic weights consisting of e   e  ⁄  where e   represents population size in 
district j belonging to the ethnic group of the largest share in district i, and ei is the total population 
of district i’s largest ethnic group in its all adjacent districts. Therefore,          might  be  designated 
as the ethnicity-augmented  spatial lag term. We expect θ to be positive if poverty or income 




Table 4 presents the estimated results. Basic characteristics remain almost unchanged, except 
that the effect of ethnic fractionalization on poverty turns to be statistically not significant. More 
importantly, we found statistically significant positive coefficients of the ethnicity-augmented spatial 
lag term for both poverty and income. The case of income spillover is of particular interest. 
Although we did not find a spatial correlation in equation (2), Table 4 shows that the income 
spillover is statistically significant between ethnically similar adjacent districts. We can extend the 
following conjecture from this result. Interactions through the market transaction and extra-market 
interaction (such as knowledge exchange and technological spillovers) will be mutual beneficial of 
all participants. In the case of the Kenyan regional economy, income spillovers were found only 
between ethnically similar adjacent districts. In general, such effects are not statistically significant. 
Therefore, we cannot blame only the geographical division for the lack of income spillover but this 
suggests the case of ethnic bias, which impedes interactions across geographical space. 
We found poverty spillover for both a general setting (Table 3) and an ethnically similar 
situation (Table 4), which suggests that ethnic filtering is not relevant in the context of poverty 
spillovers because factors related to the natural geography that is common to adjacent districts are 
dominant determinants: disease contagion, climate (temperature, rainfall/ precipitation), and soil 
quality. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 
As described in this paper, we examine the influence of ethnic diversity on costs of interaction 
among regions. They eventually engender inefficiency of market economies. Using regional data of 
Kenya, we found that income spillovers depend on ethnic similarity, which suggests the influence of 
ethnic bias. This result implies, for policy making, that the question of interregional transaction costs 
cannot be narrowly focused on problems of transportation infrastructure but it is also related with 
ethnic divisions in African context. If confinement of interactions on ethnic lines is strong, then it 
will not be sufficient to construct a physical infrastructure to promote internal market integration but 
policies for remedying ethnic bias should be also addressed. If we were to take ethnic bias as a given 6 
 
structure, then policies that allow cross-border interactions among similar ethnic groups located in 
different countries will create more scale economies and growth-enhancement (Shipton, 2009). 
For more precise policy discussion, it is indispensable to study the microfoundation of ethnic 
bias in rigorous empirical methodology. One promising direction is the formation of trust-based 
divisions, as have already been studied by Fafchamps (2004). One can also examine institutional 
frameworks to promote trust among heterogeneous agents. We must also pursue solutions along 
political dimensions. Stewart (2010) states that group boundaries can be made, or even invented, by 
political and social leaders to achieve political or economic goals. People can be mobilized as a 
group for grievances and under some other banner. It is a consensual belief that ethnic diversity itself 
is not a source of divisions and conflicts. As Ong’wen (2010) emphasizes, inequitable distribution of 
land and political power in favor of particular ethnic groups and strong grievances of the people who 





Alesina, Alberto and Eliana La Ferrara (2005) “Ethnic diversity and economic performance,” 
Journal of Economic Literature 43: 762-800. 
Bates, Robert H. (2000) “Ethnicity and development in Africa: a reappraisal,” American Economic 
Review 90: 131-134. 
Bosker, Maarten and Harry Garretsen (2008) Economic geography and economic development in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, CESifo Working Paper 2490. 
Collier, Paul and Anthony Venables (2010) “Trade and economic performance: Does Africa’s 
fragmentation matter?” in Justin Yifu Lin and Boris Pleskovic eds. Annual World Bank 
Conference on Development Economics 2009 Global, Washington, D.C. World Bank: 51-76. 
Easterly, William and Ross Levine (1997) “Africa’s growth tragedy: policies and ethnic divisions,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 1203-50. 
Fafchamps, Marcel (2004) Market Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 
Fujita, Masahisa, Paul Krugman and Anthony Venables (1999) The Spatial Economy, Cambridge, 
MA, MIT Press. 
Jellal, Mohamed and Yves Zenou (2005) Ethnic diversity, market structure and risk sharing in 
developing countries, CEPR Discussion Papers 5366. 
Miguel, Edward and Mary Kay Gugerty (2005) “Ethnic diversity, social sanctions, and public goods 
in Kenya,” Journal of Public Economics 89: 2325-2368. 
Minnesota Population Center (2010) Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 
6.0 [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 7 
 
Montalvo, Jose G. and Marta Reynal-Querol (2005) “Ethnic diversity and economic development,” 
Journal of Development Economics 76: 293-323. 
Ong’wen, Oduor (2010) Ethnicity in relation to conflict over control and accessed to natural 
resources in Africa: The case of Kenya. Paper presented at Yale Workshop on Ethnic Diversity 
and Economic Instability in Africa (January 16-17), Yale University. 
Oucho, John O. (2002) Undercurrents of Ethnic Conflict in Kenya, Leiden, Brill. 
Ranis, Gustav (2009) Diversity of communities and economic development: an overview, Paper 
presented at Kobe Conference on Ethnic Diversity and Economic Instability in Africa (July 
13-14), Kobe University. 
Shipton, Parker (2009) Ethnicity, economy, and mobility, Paper presented at Kobe Conference on 
Ethnic Diversity and Economic Instability in Africa (July 13–14), Kobe University. 
Stewart, Frances (2010) “Horizontal inequalities and conflict: an introduction and some hypothesis,” 
in Frances Stewart ed. Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict, New York, Palgrave Macmillan: 
3-24. 
Taylor, Charles Lewis and Michael C. Hudson (1972) The World Handbook of Political and Social 
Indicators, 2
nd. Edition, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press. 
UNDP (2006) Kenya National Human Development Report 2006, Nairobi, UNDP. 
Venables, Anthony (2010) “Economic geography and African development,” Papers in Regional 
Science 89: 469-483. 
 
  8 
 
Appendix: Variable definition 
 
pov_ratio: headcount ratio under the poverty line reported in Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 
1999 Census of Population and Housing. 
pc_income: natural logarithm of GDP per capita in 2005 reported by UNDP (2006), Appendix i. 
road: dummy representing districts lying on international trunk (“class A”) roads. 
no_edu: ratio of persons 15 years and older without completing primary education, calculated from 
microdata of the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 1999 Census of Population and Housing, 
obtained from IPUMS-I (Minnesota Population Center, 2010). 
adult_illiteracy: 1 minus the adult illiteracy ratio of 2005, as estimated by UNDP (2006), Appendix 
i. 
fractionalization: measure of ethnic diversity calculated using the formula of 1 ∑        by Taylor 
and Hudson (1972), where sij stands for the share of ith ethnic group (tribe) in district j. Data of 
ethnic composition at district-level is obtained from Central Bureau of Statistics, Kenya Population 
Census 1989. 
polarization: measure of ethnic polarization using the formula 4∑∑            
 
     introduced by 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). 
Nyanza, Rift Valley, and Central are regional dummies representing districts belonging to respective 




  9 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
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Table 2. Regression results with regional dummies 
  pov_ratio pov_ratio  pc_income  pc_income 
Road  -0.040154  **  -0.0354573 ** -0.0338705   -0.07589   
  (0.0161025)    (0.0149134)  (0.1714399)   (0.1720885)   
no_edu  0.2344886  ***  0.2394624 ***     
  (0.055839)    (0.0485739)       
adult_illiteracy       -1.22584 *  -1.140387  ** 
       (0.65434)   (0.5582955)   
fractionalization      -0.0927405 ***    0.8152888  ** 
      (0.032022)      (0.3860441)   
Polarization  -0.054102       0.4190911     
  (0.0412469)       (0.3717827)     
Nyanza  0.0948081  **  0.0844276 *** -0.0723709  0.0258334   
  (0.029431)    (0.0294909)  (0.1925601)   (0.1814985)   
Rift Valley  -0.0939295  ***  -0.0976902 *** 0.0072516  0.0252957   
  (0.0181776)    (0.0169064)  (0.2207658)   (0.2161774)   
Central  -0.2260062  ***  -0.2383974 ***     
  (0.0262816)    (0.0258739)       
Nairobi_Central       0.507424 *  0.5954395  *** 
       (0.2847261)   (0.2247545)   
Constant  0.4699371  ***  0.4760187 *** 6.728047 *** 6.59691 *** 
  (0.0479139)    (0.0428439)  (0.3338173)   (0.2753026)   
R-squared  0.7332   0.7541   0.1708   0.2282  
Prob. > F  0   0   0.0103   0.0002  
Observation  69   69   69   69  
*** 1%, **5%, *10%. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 3. Regression results with spatial correlation 
 pov_ratio  pov_ratio  pc_income  pc_income 
Road  -0.0458996 **  -0.0409929 **  0.0118628   -0.0231559  
  (0.0192405)   (0.0183548)   (0.1637239)   (0.1563547)  
no_edu  0.167372 **  0.1798538 **      
  (0.0836058)   (0.0827373)       
adult_illiteracy       -1.540431 *** -1.52936  *** 
       (0.5801538)   (0.4984949)   
fractionalization     -0.0884833 **     0.7536241  ** 
     (0.0393338)     (0.3587953)   
Polarization  -0.0595084       0.2789139      
  (0.0371971)      (0.3020793)     
W*pov_ratio  0.9586826  ***  0.9658064 ***      
  (0.1403531)    (0.1299536)        
W*pc_income        0.1777369   0.2890305   
        (0.2745791)   (0.2589353)   
Constant  -0.0238925   -0.0343925   5.771954 **  4.935014 *** 
 (0.0735505)    (0.0746591)   (1.855182)    (1.749749)   
R-squared 0.5725    0.5912   0.1305   0.1901   
Prob. > F 0    0   0.0609   0.0047   
Observation 69    69   69   69   
*** 1%, **5%, *10%. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Regression results with ethnicity-weighted spatial correlation 
 pov_ratio  pov_ratio  pc_income  pc_income 
Road  -0.043895 **  -0.042358 **  -0.016126   -0.039841  
  (0.0204129)   (0.0195607)   (0.157504)   (0.1500607)  
no_edu  0.1874827 **  0.1990724 **      
  (0.0829944)   (0.0866672)       
adult_illitearcy       -1.428324 *** -1.465143  *** 
       (0.5187375)  (0.4698105)   
fractionalization     -0.032579      0.6030055  * 
     (0.0412908)      (0.3393688)   
Polarization  -0.010317       0.1961421      
  (0.039874)       (0.2852494)      
E*W* pov_ratio  0.6861334 ***  0.6777612 ***        
  (0.1064225)    (0.1057059)        
E*W* pc_income         0.4395456 *** 0.4222738  *** 
         (0.1560752)   (0.159973)   
Constant  0.0908942   0.0936748   4.089088 *** 4.106704 *** 
  (0.0703801)    (0.0700019)  (1.064078)  (1.075231)   
R-squared  0.5419    0.5457  0.2172  0.2585   
Prob. > F  0    0  0.0015  0.0005   
Observation  69    69  69  69   
*** 1%, **5%, *10%. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 